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vailed that Lord Wellesley announced that
he would prohibit by military force the usual
decoration on November fourth by the
Orange Societies of William's statue in
Dublin. This action naturally aroused the
anger of the Orangemen. When, therefore,
shortly afterwards, Lord Wellesley attended
the theatre in state, the Orange fanatics were
on hand in force to hoot his lordship. Dur-
ing the disturbance thereby created a bottle
was thrown on the stage, and part of a child's
rattle, pitched from fhe gallery, struck near
the vice-regal box. The rioters were turned
out, and Forbes and other ringleaders were
arrested. That the hooting was preconcerted
was plain, and if Forbes and his companions
had been punished as common rioters the af-
fair would have ended at once. But Welles-
ley and Piunkett persuaded themselves of the
advisability of filing a criminal information
against Forbes and ten' other members of
the Orange lodges who had taken a promi-
nent part in the disturbance, not only for riot
and for intent to injure the lord-lieutenant,
but for a preconcerted criminal conspiracy to
effect such purposes-and this, too, after the
grand jury had refused to find an indictment.
The trial of the information was a ridiculous
fizzle, utterly unworthy of the ability dis-
played in the prosecution. The testimony
of a customs clerk and of another witness
who was an applicant for government pa-
tronage, on which the prosecution relied to
prove the intent to inflict personal injury, ut-
terly failed, and the remainder of the evi-
dence was equally trivial and improbable.
The jury disagreed and the prosecution was
finally dropped.
SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING FROM
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.
IV.
The Construction, Sale and Exportation by Neutral States and Individuals of War
Ships, Submarine Boats, and Other Vessels Adapted to Warlike
Use and Intended for Belligerent Service.
By AMos S. HERSHEY,
Associate Professor of European History and Politics, Indiana University.
N a previous paper 1 reference was made to
the fact that "the only serious charges of
a violation of neutral duties on the part of a
great European Power lie against Germany,
viz., the failure of the German Government
to prevent the sale to Russia of several trans-
atlantic steamers belonging to its auxiliary
navy, and the exportation of a number of
torpedo boats to Russian territory." "These
transactions," it was said, "raise some very
difficult and delicate questions which are in-
separably connected with a great historical
controversy." These we shall now proceed
to consider.
'See THE GREEN BAG for July, T904.
The charge has been freely circulated in
the newspapers, and has even been made on
the floor of the German Reichstag' that the
Russian Government has purchased several
vessels (notably the Mist Bismarch of the
Hamburg-American Line), belonging to a
great German transatlantic line, whose ves-
sels are auxiliary cruisers of the German
navy. In rep!y to the strictures of Herr
2By Herr Bebel. the famous leader of the So-
cialists. See N. Y. Times for Apr. 15, 1904. For
other reported sales see, e.g., London Times(weekly ed.) for Apr. 15th and May 13th, and N.
Y. Times for May iith. It was also reported that
Japan had bought eight steamers belonging to
the North German Lloyd Co., but this report has
been officially denied by the Japanese Govern-
ment.
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Bebel, who maintained that "such sales ac-
complish indirectly the reinforcement of the
Russian navy," Chancellor von Biilow i's re-
ported to have defended them on the ground
that, "according to the principles of Inter-
national Law hitherto prevailing, the sale of
the vessels of a private firn to a foreign
State was admissable." "At any rate," he de-
clared, "the question was a doubtful one."
He admitted that "the principle of neutrality
forbids a neutral State from giving direct
or indirect support to either belligerent
through furnishing ships for war transporta-
tion purposes." However, "in the case of
the Russian transports, it was not to a State,
but to private firms that the vessels were
sold. There could not be any question of
taking sides against Japan, since she also had
full liberty to buy Vessels from Germany."
It has also been charged on the floor of
the German Reichstag, ' as well as in the
newspapers, that the German Government
has permitted the exportation of a number
of torpedo boats and destroyers for the use
of the Russian navy. It is charged that, for
the purpose of disguising these transactions,
"the several parts of the vessels are being ex-
ported as half-finished manufactures and put
together in Libau, Russia," whither, it is re-
ported, a large number of German workmen
have been sent. It is also asserted that these
submarine boats were originally built for the
German Government which refuse-I to take
them because the terms of the contract (i. C..
the stipulations as to time limit), tinder
which the- were built had nor been strictly
observed.
it appears, however, that Germany is not
the only country in which Russian agents
have been busy in making and soliciting con-
tracts for the purchase or construction of
vessels foi- the Russian navy or for the use of
'For reports of these somewhat puzzling utter-
ances, see N. Y. Times and Chicago Tribune for
Apr. i5, 1904.
'By Herr Bernstein. the anti-Behel Socialistic
leader. See, e.g., N. Y. Times for May 5th. and
editorials in N. Y. Tribune for May 14th and Hart-
ford Comrant for May 5th.
Russia in the present war, but that Russian
agents have also been busy in other coun-
tries, and that the Japanese have also been
active in a similar direction. Germany ap-
pears, however, to be the only State in which
such acts have been defended, if not encour-
aged, by the official or responsible head of
the Government.
It is reported that Russia has ordered five
armored cruisers to be. built at Trieste.-
where Japan was said to be busy negiotiating
for the purchase of a number of vessels at an
earlier period I of the war. Russia is also
said to have purchased a number of fast
cargo vessels in England. These, it is sup-
posed, are to be altered so as to enable them
to be used as transports.' It is also stated
that several new battleships had been or-
dered by Japan in England prior to the be-
ginning of the war, and that these are now
being built.6 The Russian and Japanese
Governments are said to be competing
sharply for the purchase of transports in
H1olland and Belgium, 7 and we have heard
repeated rumors to the effect that agents of
both the Russian and Japanese Governments
have been negotiating for the purchase of
cruisers of several South American States,
more particularly with the Government of
the Argentine Republic.' It has also been
vaguely rumored that Turkey has been pur-
chasing ships on Russia's a ccount.?
Nor is this all. It has even been asserted
that Japanese (and possibly also -Russian)
agents have been at work in the United
States. It is reported that a conirart has
been awarded the Newport News Shipbuild-
ing Company of Newport News, Va., for the
'Chicago Tribune for June i, 1904. This report
has since been contradicted by the Vienna cor-
resoondent of the London Times.4 Ibid. for Apr. 14, 1904.
'N. Y. Times for May 28, 1904.
sChicago Record-Herald for Apr. 10, 1904.
'N. Y. Times for May 25, 1904.
'See especially H. W. Wilson in London and
N. Y. Times for May 26, 1904. It has recently
(June 2oth) been reported that the negotiations
with Argentina have failed.
'N. Y. Times for June 13, i904.
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construction of four Lake submarine boats
destined for service in the Japanese Navy in
the present war.' A stockholder of the
Lake Submarine Torpedo Boat Company of
Bridgeport, Conn., is reported to have
stated, in April, that negotiations had been
practically completed for the sale ot the sub-
marine topedo boat Protector to, represen-
tatives of the Japanese Government, the
Japanese agent having outbid the agent of
the Russian Government.2  This torpedo
boat is since supposed to have been shipped
as cargo on board the Norwegian steamer
Fortuna, bound nominally for Cork, but
really for Japan ;3 and a Russian newspaper
(the Novoc Vremya) has expressed the hope
that the United States Government will
make a detailed explanation of why the boat
was allowed to leave the territory of the
United States.4
These reports may be more or less want-
ing in accuracy and authenticity, but, assum-
ing that they are substantially correct, they
may serve to give a foreground of life to our
discussion as to whether the construction,
sale, and exportation on the part of neutral
States and individuals, of warships, torpedo
boats, and other vessels adapted to warlike
use and intended for belligerent service con-
stitute a violation of neutral obligations, and
to what extent or under what circumstances
a neutral State can be held responsible for
such violation.
It, of course, goes without saying, that the
direct sale of a war vessel by 'a neutral State
to either belligerent would be a gross breach
of neutrality, for which ample redress or
reparation by the injured State ought at once
to be demanded, and, if necessary, exacte1.
'N. Y. Times for May ii. 1904.
'Chicago Reoord-Herald for AT)r. 28, 1904. An-
other stockholder has recently (June i~th)
claimed that the Protector was sold to Russia.
'N. Y. Sun for June io and 14, 1904. The Pro-
tector anpears finally to have turned up in Kron-
stadt, Russia. See N. Y. Times for July 8, 1904.
Several other lake sub-marine boats are since re-
ported to have left the United States for Russia.
'Chicago Tribune for June 12, 1904.
Since the settlement of the famous "Ala-
bama Case" by the Treaty of Washington in
1871, and the Geneva Award of 1872, there
can scarcely be any more room for doubt
but that the fitting out and departure from,
as well as the arming and equipping 5 in, a
neutral port of a vessel intended for the use
of either belligerent is a serious violation of
neutrality, if knowingly permitted by a neu-
tral government. The First Rule of the
Treaty of Washington declares that "a neu-
tral State is bound to use due diligence to
prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping
within its jurisdiction of any vessel which it
has reasonable ground to believe is intended
to cruise or to carry on war against a Power
with which it is at peace, and also like dif-
gence to prevent the departure from its jur-
isdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or
carry on war as above, such vessel having
been specially adapted, in whole or in part,
within such jurisdiction to warlike use." '
Although the principles incorporated into
this rule have not won the unreserved ap-
proval of all English publicists, 7 and have
'The arming and equipping of such a vessel,
as also the augmentation of the force of a war
vessel in a neutral port, had been prohibited 1y
International Law, as well as the British and
American Neutrality Acts, many years before.
'For the Three Rules of the Treaty of Wash-
ing-ton, see, e.g., Wharton's Dig. III., p. 630.
7e.g., Hall (§225 and notes) and Lawrence
(§§262 and 263). Hall, although he insists that
this is not the law, was of the opinion that such a
usage is in course of growth. He seems more-
over to have looked upon such a rule or usage
as healthy and desirable, if not based upon the
doctrine of intent in place of which he suggests
the alternative principle of the character of thL
vessel. Lawrence thinks "the question is still far
from settlement." He says that "the old prin
ciples have been thoroughly discredited and the
maritime Powers have come to no agreement
upon new ones." That the First Rule of th"
Treaty of Washington is probably a rule of In-
ternational Law is admitted by Walker (Manual,
§65) "provided a fair interpretation be accorded
to the phrase 'due diligence.' " "The general
consensus of opinions of publicists, with some
dissent in England, is that they (the Three Rules
of the Treaty of Washington) are a correct state-
ment of existing International Law." Foster,
American Diplomacy, p. 429.
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not been formally accepted by the Powers,'
they may now be regarded as forming an
integral and important part of the correct
practice of International Law. They have,
generaly speaking, found favor in the eyes
of continental jurists, 2  and they were
adopted, although in somewhat altered lan-
guage, by the Institute of International Law
in 1875.3 They have long: since been incor-
porated in the Neutrality and Foreign En-
listment Acts of the United States and Great
Britain,4 and the British Foreign Enlistment
'The United States and Great Britain agreed,
according to the terms of the Treaty of Washing-
ton, to abide by these rules in their future rela-
tions with each other, and to invite other mari-
time Powers to accede to them. but this has never
been done. The failure to invite or secure the
adhesion of the maritime Powers does not, how-
ever, destroy their validity or impair the value
and importance of the decision of the Geneva
Board of Arbitration as a priecedent. Additions
to International Law are usually the result of a
natural growth rather than of formal legislation,
and if all such additions had to wait for the formal
sanction of the Powers, there would be, com-
paratively speaking, little growth or progress.
If the decisions of national prize courts constitute
an important source of International Law, how
much greater should be the value of the decisions
of International Courts of Arbitration as prece-
dents.
Although the value and importance of the deci-
sion of the Geneva Board of Arbitration as a
precedent can scarcely be called into question,
there is still some difference of opinion in regard
to the correct meaning of the phrase "due dili-
gence"; there are serious objections to the Am-
erican doctrine of intent; and all of the decisions
of the Geneva arbitrators (or rather the reason-
ing on which some of these decisions was based)
have not been fully accepted on all sides.
2 See, e.g., Calvo in Revue de Droit International,
VI., pp. 453 if; Bluntschli in the same review, II.,
pp. 452 ff; Calvo, Le Droit Int. IV., §2,623; Blunt-
tome's trans.) III., §1,555; Rivier, II., §68, pp. 405
ff.
, Tableau Generale de l'Jostitut, pp. i61-63. Cf. An-
nuaire for 1877, p. 139.
The United States Neutrality Acts of 1794 and
i818 and the British Foreign Enlistment Acts of
i8i9 and 1870. The British Act of I8i9. like the
United States Act of 1794 and I818, prohibited the
fitting out, as well as the arming, of any vbssel
with intent, etc.; but the administrative and pre-
ventative powers (viz., those requiring bond and
authorizing detention for probable cause) of the
tenth and eleventh sections of the United States
Act of I818 were omitted in the British Act ,4t
I819. The evidence required in order to con-
Act of 1870, which has been pronounced by a
leading authority to be "perhaps the best
and fairest expression of the modern rule
anywhere to be found in public law,"' goes
at least one step farther than our own Neu-
tralitv Act and the Treaty of Washington.
It prohibits not only the commissioning,
equipping, and dispatching, but also the
building or construction, of "any ship with
intent or knowledge or having reasonable
cause to believe that the same shall or will
be employed in the military or naval service
of any foreign State at war with any friendly
State." 6
True it is that there is a long line of Amer-
ican jurists and statesmen who have held, in
the language of Judge Story, that "there 's
vict under the British Act of I819 had to be
sufficient to satisfy a jury of the probable viola-
tion of the provisions of the statute, and such
evidence was, of course, extremely difficult to
obtain. The defects in the British Act of iSig,
were probably due to lack of effective procedure
or a want of proper administrative machinery
rather than to any lack of good intention on the
part of the legislature. To those administrative
defects there was added a certain inertness -r
indifference in the execution of the law, if not of
positive sympathy with the Southern Confederacy,
on the part of the governing classes of England
which lamed the energies of the British Govern-
ment and caused its failure to strictly observe its
obligations of neutrality during our Civil War.
Snow's Cases, p. 438, Cf. Scott's edition, p. 720.
§8 of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870.
See 33 and 34 Vict. 90. For a convenient abri-'g-
ment of the British and American Neutrality
Acts, see Scott's edition of Snow's Cases, pp.
692-95.
' In the Santissina Trinidad, U. S. Supreme
Court, 1827, 7 Wheat. 283. For a digest of lead-
ing American cases involving a breach of our
neutrality laws, see Dana's Wheaton, note 215. pp.
543-557. For opinions of American statesmen
and judges, see Wharton's Dig. 11., §§,39 and
3g6. See especially the opinions of Sec. Clay and
those of Judges Betts and Nelson in the case of
the Meteor. Sec. Clay was of the opinion that "if
the neutral show no partiality; if he is as ready
to sell to one belligerent as the other; and if he
take, himself, no nart in the war, he cannot be
justly accused of any violation of his neutral obli-
gations." But then Mr. Clay does not seem to
have been absolutely stire that it was a violation
of neutrality for the head of a State to sell, to a
belligerent, ships of war completely equipped and
armed for battle. Mr. Clay, Sec'y of State to Mr.
Tacon, Wharton's Dig. III., p. 521.
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nothing in our laws, or in the law of nations,
that forbids our citizens from sending armed
vessels, as well as munitions of war, to for-
ei gn ports for sale. It is a commercial ad-
venture which no nation is bound to prohibit.
and which only exposes the persons engaged
in it to the penalty of confiscation." The
American view that vessels, built or sent out
with the animus vivendi are mere contraband
of war, but that any vessels fitted out
or dispatched with the aniluts bell!-
gerandi constitute in effect a proximate
hostile expedition which it is the duty of the
neutral government to prevent, if possible,
by the use of a reasonable diligence is one
which was long insisted upon, especially by
American statesmen, judges, and publicists.
and which still holds a place in some impor-
tant works on International Law." But this
view can scarcely be maintained any longer
in the face of the First Rule of the Treaty
of Washington, and of the increasingly sen-
sitive and ever-growing sense of neutral obli-
gations on the part of modern nations. As
one of our best American authorities, the
late lamented Dr. Freeman Snow, has well
said: "In considering this question, it should
be remembered that, by the introduction of
steam as the motive power of ships, and of
iron and steel as the material of their con-
struction, the conditions of maritime war-
fare have been very radically changed. What
might have been a reasonable rule as ap-
plied in the time of sailing ships, might now,
in the age of swift ironclads, be intolerably
oppressive. In the cases of the Santissisa
Trindad, U. S. v. Quincy, and the Meteor,
the courts were dealing with small sailing
vessels, which had been converted into pri-
vateers, the possession of which by one or
the other belligerent made very little differ-
'The best and most authoratative statement of
this view is by Dana. See Dana's Wheaton, note
215, p. 563. A recent defence of this view may be
found in Taylor. International Law, V., c. 2.
ence in the general result of the struggle:
whereas, the possession of an ironclad ship
might well turn the scale one way or the
other, as indeed it did in the war between
Chili and Peru, in i88o-i8Si. This great
power of inflicting injury upon one of the
belligerents, it is fair to say, ought not to be
permitted to neutral citizens, and the neutral
nation is alone in a position to restrain them.
"In view of these facts, it is believed that
the doctrine set up by the United States
Neutrality Act and by the Federal Courts,
that the 'intent' of the owner or shipbuilder
is the criterion by which his guilt or inno-
cence is to be judged, is wholly inadequate;
it would not for a moment stand the test of
the rule of 'due diligence,' as applied by the
Geneva tribunal." 2
'Snow's Cases, note on "The Three Rules of
the Treaty of Washington" on pp. 437-38. This
note has been reproduced, with the addition of a
few references, in the recent enlargment and re-
vision of Dr. Snow's work, entitled "Scott's
Cases," p. 720. The value to the student of ths
otherwise excellent work is greatly impaired iy
the fact that it is impossible to distinguish in
respect to the notes between the contributions
of Dr. Snow and those of Dr. Scott except by a
comparison of the two texts. We trust that this
fault may be corrected in a subsequent edition.
The American doctrine of intent has also been
justly and severely criticised by a number of Eng-
lish writers. Walker (The Science, etc., p. 5oo)
points out that it "leaves open to fraud a wide
and open door. Who may know the intent of P
crafty and secret mind? A thousand tricks and
devices may be employed to disarm suspicion.
An unarmed vessel may be dispatched from a neu-
tral port, arms and men from another, and th
intent with which these elements were prepared
and gathered together may only become apparent
on their combination at some spot far beyond
the bounds of the neutral jurisdiction." Law-
rence (p. 548) says, "nothing is more difficult to
prove than intentions. They have frequently to
be inferred from actions of an ambiguous charac-
ter. Moreover, the two intents-that of selling
and that of making war-may co-exist in the same
mind." Bernard (Neutrality, p. 389) declares, "In
international wrongs . . . the intent is not the
thing chiefly or mainly regarded; and in interna-
tional wrongs of this particular class the only
intent and the only inadvertance which are really
material are, first, that hostility in the persons
who constitute or direct the expedition which
makes it noxious instead of harmless; and second-
ly. that connivance or negligence on the part of
the neutral Government which makes the nation
Some Questions oJ Internalional Law.
In view of the unsatisfactory and inade-
quate character of the older body of doctrine,
would it not be \xeli to take a step or two
even beyond the First Rule of the Treaty of
Washington and broadly assert that a neu-
tral State is bound to use due diligence (i.c.,
a kind and degree of diligence reasonably
sufficient under the circumstances), to pre-
responsible for the noxious enterprise." Dana
(cited above), the leading champion of the doctrine
of intent, admits that "the act is open to great
suspicions and abuse, and the line may often b'
scarcely traceable." Hall (p. 619, note) remarks
upon this passage, "It is eminently inadvisable in
matter which may lead to international contro-
versy to adopt as the test of the character of ain
action anything so indeterminable as to be 'often
scarcely traceable.' No intent other than that
which is inferred from acts of a broadly marked
character can be safely so used." Cf. Lawrence,
p. 548.
The cQmplexity which surrounds this doctrine
of intent and the fine distinctions to which it
may lead in practice may be seen by consulting
the case of the U. S. v. Quincy (Supreme Court
of the U. S., 1832, 6 Peters, 445). In that case
a distinction was made between a fixed and pres-
ent intent on the one hand and a conditional or
contingent intent on the other. It was held that
if the intent was to send the vessel in question to
the West Indies in search of funds with which
to complete her armament, with no present or
fixed intention of preying upon the commerce of
a friendly State, but with a mere conditional or
contingent intent or wish to fit her out after her
arrival there, it was not an illegal transaction.
On the other hand the older English doctrine to
the effect that a ship adapted for war is'a mere
article of contraband unless she left the neutral
port in a condition capable of committing hosti-
lities the moment she entered upon her voyage
was wholly unsatisfactory and absurdly inade-
quate. This view presupposed innocence on the
part of the owner or shipbuilder unless she was
at least partly armed and equipped in the neutral
port. This was in substance the doctrine laid
down in 1863 in the case of the Alexandra (Att.
Gen. v. Sillem, Hurlstone and Coltman, 2 Excheq.
Rep. 11, 431) by Chief Baron Pollock and Baron
Bramwell. On the Alexandria. see specially Ber-
nard, Neutrality, pp. 353-54 and note, and Walker.
The Science, p. 499.
'There has been considerable controversy as to
the true meaning of the phrase "due diligence."
The American contention at Geneva was that it
meant diligence "commensurate with the emer-
gency or with the magnitude of the results of
negligence." The British case set forth that
"due diligence on the part of the sovereign Gov-
ernment signifies that measure of care which the
Government is under an obligation to use for a
given purpose. This measure, when it has not
been defined by international usage or agree-
vent not only the fitting out, arming or
equipping, and departure of any vessel in-
tended for the use of either. belligerent, but
also the construction, sale and exportation
ment, is to be deducted from the nature of the
obligation itself, and from the considerations of
justice, equity, and general exoediency on which
the law of nations is founded." Anything more
vague and unsatisfactory that this definition can
scarcely be imagined. The Geneva arbitrators
adopted in substance the American definition,
although couched in somewhat different language.
They held that due diligence should be "in exact
proportion to the risks to which either of the
belligerents may be exposed from a failure to ful-
fil the obligations of neutrality on their part."
This definition has been criticised (e. g., by Law-
rence, pp. 538-39) on the ground that it accepts
the principle of a "changing standard" of neutral
obligations, and "imposes different degrees of re-
sponsibility upon different neutrals in the same
war, and thus destroys that impartiality which is
the essence of neutral duty." But it is doubtful
whether any definition which has been or which
might be framed would be wholly free from diffi-
culty or to which serious objection might not be
made. Lawrence suggests (p. 540) that "the
kind and amount of diligence which a strong and
careful Government would use to put down
smuggling ought to be used by neutral States to
fulfil the obligations of their neutrality." This sug-
gestion would certainly seem to furnish a good
practical working rule or standard of neutral obli-
gations, but it may be doubted whether even this
would give us the precise and absolute standard
which Lawrence seems to be in search of. Cer-
tainly some account should also be taken of the
"emergency" and of the "risks" or "magnitude of
the results of negligence." For example, the*
same degree or amount of diligence would
scarcely be required in the case of a small sub-
marine boat as in the case of a large war ship
or of a number of these. For a severe criticism
of the definition of "due diligence" adopted by a
majority of the arbitrators. see an article by
Rolin Jwquemyns in the Revue de Troit Int. VI.,
pp. 567 ft.. For citations from the opinions of
the Geneva arbitrators, see Wharton's Dig. III_
402a and Moore's History of Arbitration, IV.. c.
68. For a full and complete history of the "Ala-
bama Case" and the Geneva Award, U. S. Diplo-
matic Correspondence for the years 1863-1871;
Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington;
Case of Great Britain with Appendix; Claims of
the U. S.; Case of the U. S. For a good abridge-
ment of the proceedings of the Geneva Board,
see Moore on Arbitration, I., c. 14. For a good
short history of the "Alabama Case," see Walker,
Science of International Law, pp. 458-502. For
an excellent stimmary of the controversy from
the British point of view, see Bernard's Historical
Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain during
the American Civil War. For a summary of the
controversy from the American point of view, see
Cushing's Treaty of Washington.
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of any war ship whatsoever for or to anv
other than a bona fide neutral purchaser?
Nay, would it not be well to go still farther
and insist that a neutral State is bound to use
due diligence to prevent the construction
for, or sale to, a belligerent purchaser, or the
exportation to a belligerent destination,' of
any vessel which is adapted or readily con-
vertible to warlike use? It will be said that
this is an invasion of the commercial rights
of neutral individuals who depend upon ship-
building for a livelihood or for profit, and
that it imposes onerous and difficult burdens
upon neutral States. Besides, "if a distinc-
tion is to be made between vessels service-
able for warlike use and other vessels, where.
it may be asked, are we to fix the line? 2 It
is very doubtful whether our shipbuilding in-
terests 3 would greatly suffeer by an adoption
of these principles; but, even supposing that
this were the case, have communities or na-
tions ever hesitated to sacrifice the vested
rights or commercial interests of certain in-
dividuals, or even classes, to the general wel-
fare of society as a whole? If they have not
In case the destination were nominally neutral,
but really belligerent, the doctrine of "continu-
ous voyage" might be made to apply.
" Bernard, op. cit., p. 395.
As stated in the text, it is very doubtful wheth-
er these interests would suffer to any considerabie
extent. Even under the interpretation given to
our present law, it is rather difficult to imagine
a case where such a vessel might be so disposed
of (if sold to a belligerent purchaser or dis-
patched to a belligerent destination) as to free
the neutral trader or builder from all taint of
suspicion of being engaged in an illegal venture
or an unlawful transaction (see, e.g., the cases of
the Meteor and the U. S. v. Quincy, cited above).
In practice it is very difficult to distinguish be-
tween a belligerent and a commercial intent. It
only opens the door to fraud. There is no at-
tempt at such a distinction in the case of contra-
band of war where the character of the articles or
the belligerent destination furnishes the essential
justification of capture. The main difference be-
tween the two cases would be that in the case oi
contraband the right of capture belongs to the
belligerent; in that of vessels adapted to warlike
use and intended for a belligerent destination, the
duty of prevention would rest on the neutral, as it
indeed already does to a very considerable extent.
hesitated to exact these sacrifices in the in-
terest of particular communities or nations,
how much less hesitation should there be
when the welfare of humanity at large or the
collective interests of civilization are at
stake! But, it may be asked, should we not
go still one step farther, and, as has fre-
quently been suggested, prohibit all trade in
arms and ammunition or implements of war-
fare between belligerents and neutrals? To
this piece of apparently unanswerable logic
we may reply that to compel neutral States
to assume such responsibilities would indeed
involve the imposition of such burdens that
they might in some cases prefer the status of
belligerency to that of neutrality. In fram-
ing rules of International Law we must be
careful never to exceed the limits of the prac-
tical, and we must avoid the mistake into
which our Legislatures so often fall of fram-
ing rules which are to difficult or which are
impossible to enforce.
Would the prohibition of the construction
for, or sale to, a belligerent purchaser, or the
exportation to a belligerent destination of all
vessels adapted or readily convertible to war-
like use be impossible of execution or too
difficult to enforce? Some at least of our
modern States have already burdened them-
selves with considerable responsibility in this
direction. According to our own Neutrality
Law, such a vessel might indeed be built and
sold as an article of commerce, but it could
not be suffered to depart from any of our
ports if intended for the use of either belli-
gerent. In England, since the enactment of
the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870,
such a vessel could not even be built or con-
tracted for. According to the older statutes,
the Alabama might have been built and sold
as an article of commerce, if she had notbeen
directly intended for the service of the Con-
federacy. But, as an able writer has well
said: "It is clear that proof of an intention
hostile in fact, or constructively hostile, in
the builder of a ship or his workmen, or in
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the maker or purveyor of guns or ammuni-
tion, has really little or nothing to do. with
the question whether the belligerent nation
has sustained injury from the neutral. To
the United States it was of no consequence
at all what were the intentions of Laird or
Miller, or their riggers or ship carpenters.
or whether these persons, or any of them.
were animated by partiality to the Confeder-
ates, or were merely working, in the exer-
cise of their respective trades, for what they
could get. What was of consequence to the
United States was the intention with which
the vessels were dispatched from England
by those who had at that time the real con-
trol of them. . . . Nor did it matter to the
United States whether the vessels were pur-
chased ready-made or were built to or-
der. . . . In a word, as between nations,
the intent which impresses on an armed ship
dispatched from a neutral port the character
of a hostile expedition is the intent which
governs the dispatch of the ship, not the in-
tent which presided over its preparation."*
In respect to the difficulty of distinguish-
ing between vessels serviceable for warlike
use and other vessels, it must be admitted
that this is a real and serious difficulty; but
it is one which might, we think, be overcome
by the exercise of proper care and exertion
on the part bf the neutral government. 2
Bernard, op. cit., pp. 196-97. This argument was
used by Bernard against the American claims,
but it merely proves the inconsistency or inade-
quacy of the American doctrine of intent. This
doctrine is now mainly open to criticism because
it does not go far enough. It is too narrow and
restricted in its scope. By prohibiting the coni-
mercial as well as the belligerent intent, much of
the difficulty and doubt to which it has given rise
vanishes.
'This is a question for experts. Hall (p. 620)
says: "Experts are perfectly able to distinguish
vessels built primarily for warlike use: there
would therefore be little practical difficulty in
preventing their exit from neutral ports, and
there is no reason for relieving a neutral Gov-
ernment from a duty which it can easily perform.
But it is otherwise with many vessels primarily
fitted for commerce." Hall calls especial atten
tion to the fact that "mail steamers of large size
are fitted by their strength and build to receive,
without much special adaptation, one or two guns
There can be little question (provided the
facts have been stated correctly) but that
the German Government has been guilty of
a violation of neutrality, especially in the
matter of the torpedo boats. The fact that
these were not fully completed in neutral
territory, but were exporter in ports to Rus-
sia, ought not to free the German Govern-
iment from responsibility (provided it had
knowledge) any more than the fact that the
Alabama received her armament in Portu-
guese waters absolved the English Govern-
ment during our Civil War. Besides, both
the First and the Second Rules of the Treaty
of Washington seem expressly to cover this
case. The fact is, that any kind of a modern
war vessel is a weapon with such tremendous
possibilities of destruction that it aDuroxi-
mates to a hostile expedition; and that the
exportation of such vessels, in whole or in
part, for the use of a belligerent from a neu-
tral port amounts in effect to the use of neu-
tral territory as a base of military operations,
or the origination of a proximate act of war
on neutral soil-acts which are clearly for-
bidden by International Law.3
In respect to the sale of the German trans-
atlantic steamers, there is, perhaps, more
of sufficient calibre to render the ships carrying
them dangerous cruisers against merchantmen."
He remarks that these vessels "melt insensibly
into other types," and he thinks that "it would be
impossible to lay down a rule under which they
could be prevented from being sold to a belli-
gerent and transformed into constituent parts
of an expedition immediately outside neutral
waters without paralysing the whole ship-building
and ship-selling trade of the neutral country."
Part of this argument has been dealt with above.
Hall certainly exaggerates the injury to ship-
builders. We would not presume to say to what
extent experts can distinguish between the dif-
ferent classes of vessels. In order to secure a
pro)er enforcement of the law. guarantees or
bonds might be exacted from ship-builders and
ship-traders, such, e.g., as are required by the
terms of our own Neutrality Act. The burden of
proof should be thrown upon the ship-builder as
i; done by the British Act of 1870. He is liable
if he has "reasonable cause to believe. etc." See
above.
3"No proximate acts of war are in any man-
ner to originate on neutral ground." Sir V.
Scott in the "Twee Gebroeders," 3 C. Rob. 164.
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room for doubt. The sale of merchant ves-
sels by neutral individuals to belligerents has
generally been upheld in spite of their adapt-
ability to warlike purposes,' although the
original arming and equipping, as well
as the augmentation of the force of
such vessels after having been armed and
equipped in a neutral port, has generally
been deemed unlawful. The fact, however,
that these vessels are alleged to have been
auxiliary cruisers of the German Navy would
seem to put a different face on the matter.
In view of the close and intimate relations
which must subsist between these companies
and the German Government, the sale and
exportation of such vessels would seem to be
impossible without the consent or conniv-
ance of the German Government; and it can
hardly be contended that such consent or
connivance could be given without a serious
breach of neutral obligation.
In any case, the reported contention of
Chancellor von Billow to the effect that the
sale of the vessels of a private firm to a for-
eign State or to a private firm is admissible
cannot be maintained if it is meant that the
neutral government is free from responsibil-
ity in all such cases. It has been suggested
that Germany would not be guilty of any
breach of neutrality if she simply played the
part of an "honest broker,"2 and sold ships
of all kinds impartially to both belligerents:
but this notion is based upon a wholly erro-
neous conception of the real nature and
scope of neutrality. "Neutrality does not
consist in the mere impartial treatment of
opposing belligerents, but in the entire ab-
stinence from any assistance of either party
in-his warfare," and "a neutral government
is bound n'ot only to abstain from affording
any direct attention to the combatant force
See, e.g., the opinion of See. Clay to Mr. Rivas
Salmon in 1827, Wharton's Dig. III., p. 520. This
is not, however, in accordance with the newer.
and, as we believe, the sounder rules.
" See editorial in N. Y. Tribune for May 14, 1904.
and the opinion of Chancellor von Biilow, cited
above. This seems also to have been the opinion
of See. Clay. See Wharton's Dig. III., p. 520.
of either belligerent, but to exercise a rea-
sonable diligence in compelling the like con-
duct on the part of all persons within its juris-
diction.3 Total abstinence-not mere im-
partiality-is in these matters the real extent
of neutral obligation.
In the case of the submarine boat Protec-
tot, which was shipped as cargo on board the
Norwegian steamer Fortuna, and whicil
cleared from New York early in June, the
Government of the United States coull
in no wise be held responsible whatever
her destination, although the owners br
builders might, under certain circum-
stances, be indicted under our neutral-
ity laws. As Mr. Cass, Secretary of State,
said in i86o: "A government is responsible
only for the faithful discharge of its interna-
tional duties, but not for the consequences
of illegal enterprises, of which it had no
knowledge, or which the want of proof or
other circumstances rendered it unable to
prevent."4 "The case of the submarine is
distinctly one in which our Government
neither actually had knowledge nor was
'charged' with it. . . . To make sure that
no submarines were building in the United
States, we should have to maintain a con-
stant inspection of every shipyard and boat-
yard in the country, which is, of course, out
,of the question."i It is one of the duties
the diplomatic representatives of the belli-
gerent States in neutral countries to call the
attention of such and similar violations of
neutrality on the part of neutral individuals
to neutral Governments. "If the attention
of our Government were called, however,
by the Russian or the Japanese representa-
tive at Washington to the fact that a sub-
marine was building, supposed to be in-
tended for use against his country, our effec-
tive responsibility would then begin. That
' Walker, The Science, etc., pp. 374 and 388.
'Mr. Cass, Sec. of State, to Mfr. Molina, i86o.
See Warton's Dig III. P. 603.
See an excellent editorial on this subject in,
the N. Y. Times for June 13, 1904.
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